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Abstract
Given that Brazilian capitalism does not fit any single
ideal type variety of capitalism, the article discusses
whether Brazilian capitalism is still evolving towards
an ideal type or whether it is already at a hybrid
institutional equilibrium. The analysis focuses on the
production regime with special reference to capital-
labour-state relations and examines how firm
strategies and public policy impact the nature of
capitalism in Brazil. The analysis shows how firms
might actually be pulling Brazilian capitalism in a
different direction than the state.
Keywords: Brazil, Varieties of Capitalism, state-firm
interaction
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Resumo
Dado que o capitalismo brasileiro não se enquadra
em nenhum tipo ideal de variedade de capitalismo,
este artigo discute se o capitalismo brasileiro ainda
está evoluindo para um tipo ideal, ou se já está em
um equilíbrio híbrido institucional. A análise incide
sobre o regime de produção, com especial referência
às relações capital-trabalho-estado e analisa as
estratégias como estratégias empresariais e o políticas
públicas impactam a natureza do capitalismo no
Brasil. A análise mostra como as empresas podem
realmente estar puxando o capitalismo brasileiro em
um sentido diferente do que o estado.
Palavras-chave: Brasil, variedades de capitalismo,
interaçao estado-empresa.
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Brazil has always been resolutely capitalist, even at the height of import
substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies and heavy-handed state
intervention in the economy from the 1950s to 1980s. What has been less
clear-cut or difficult to define is the model or type of capitalism that occurs in
Brazil. A large number of typologies of contemporary capitalism have emerged
in the academic literature over the past decades (Goldthorpe 1984; Kitschelt,
Lange, Marks & Stephens 1999; Amable 2000; Coates 2000; Schmidt 2002;
Hall & Soskice 2001; Huber 2002; Boyer 2008), but none of the typologies
really fits Brazil. Here, I focus on one such typology - the Varieties of Capitalism
(VoC) approach – to put forward my findings about the nature of contemporary
Brazilian capitalism. This is not an argument for Brazilian exceptionalism,
but rather one that draws attention to the complexity of the economic realities
experienced by Brazilian firms and other social agents and the intricacies of
the process of industrial transformation experienced by state and society in
cases of later industrialisation. Given the prominence of institutional
complementarities in VoC analysis, a stable model of capitalism suggests
convergence around an ideal type (as described in the literature). The lack of
an apparently coherent model and potential difficulties in generating
institutional complementarities opens space for debate on two related
questions:
Is Brazilian capitalism already at an institutional equilibrium? If yes, then
is it bound to remain a hybrid or mixed version of the ideal varieties/types
described in the literature?
Is Brazilian capitalism still evolving towards an accepted variety/ideal type?
If yes, then in what direction?
To answer these questions, the analysis focuses mainly on the production
regime (and not on welfare or social policy aspects) with special reference to
capital-labour-state relations in industry. It examines private sector investment
strategies and public sector policies that impact industrial production and
technological development. It compares features of the Brazilian case against
features of the two ideal types in the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach.
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Applying a fresh lens, bottom-up rather than top-down in its approach to
analysing firm strategy and business-state relations in Brazil, revealed some rather
surprising (and what many would probably consider controversial) results.
This article is divided into five sections that discuss various aspects of the
VoC approach with respect to Brazil: (i) basic elements of the VoC approach
and its application to Latin American political economy; (ii) general features of
the two VoC (with respect to national and international aspects of the
production regime – see Table 1 in appendix); (iii) spheres of action of firms to
resolve coordination problems (with respect to industrial relations, education
and training, corporate governance, and inter-firm relations – see Table 2); (iv)
economic and social impacts of each VoC (with respect to firm behaviour in
the given production regime as well as consequences for the welfare regime – see
Table 3); and (v) conclusions with respect to the usefulness of the VoC approach
for understanding contemporary capitalism and development policy in Brazil.
Source: Amable 2000, Boyer 2008 (for LME & CME), Author for Brazil.
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Source: Amable 2000, Boyer 2008 (for LME & CME), Author for Brazil.
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Source: Amable 2000, Boyer 2008 (for LME & CME), Author for Brazil.
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The article aims to provoke debate and discussion on the above mentioned
issues. My interest in these debates relates to the insights they might provide in
understanding the action necessary on the public policy front to boost industrial
development. This is especially pertinent in the current context of “neo-
developmentalist” tendencies in government policies (Bresser-Pereira 2009) as
well as in campaign platforms in what is an election year in Brazil. Thus, the
article uses an argumentative style and does not systematically provide extensive
evidence (although this is available) to back up each and every argument.
Basic elements of the VoC approach
A key feature of the VoC approach, in contrast to most previous approaches
to analysing capitalism in advanced industrial democracies, is the focus on the
micro-level to understand outcomes at the macro-level. That is, the VoC approach
emphasises the individual and collective behaviour of firms/business actors and
their impact on economic and social conditions. Although it acknowledges
that institutions are critical to firm decision making and that ultimately structure
drives strategy (Hall & Soskice 2001), it is an actor-centred approach that places
key importance on the behaviour and preferences of firms.
Two edited volumes outline the main elements of the VoC approach to
analysing modern capitalism. This article discusses the different varieties of
capitalism based on the analyses in these texts. Both volumes - Kitschelt, Lange,
Marks and Stephens (1999) and Hall and Soskice (2001) - argue that there are
two main types of capitalism based on the level of coordination (especially
amongst business actors – firms and business associations) to resolve political
economy problems facing social agents. The two ideal types are labelled as
liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME).
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The VoC approach takes a relational view of the firm and as such is interested
in analysing the linkages firms establish with other firms as well as their collective
behaviour in business associations (i.e. horizontal coordination). The breadth
and depth of this coordination, including the type of business associations, is
a key element in the classification of each VoC. Notwithstanding this emphasis
on micro-level analysis, the VoC approach also acknowledges the importance
of the state in providing appropriate policies and the regulatory regimes that
control the institutional framework within which firms operate (i.e. vertical
coordination). Thus, the relationship of firms (individually and collectively) to
the state is another important element in the classification process.
The general institutional features and consequences of each variety of market
economy are presented in the tables in the appendix. Here it is sufficient to
note that according to the VoC literature, in LMEs, firms coordinate via
hierarchies and competitive market arrangements often characterised by arms-
length transactions (i.e. price tends to be the key allocative mechanism). In
contrast, in CMEs, firms depend more heavily on non-market relations for
coordination via networks and other types of collaborative relationships (i.e.
reputation, trust and negotiation serve as key allocative mechanisms). These
differences favour and reinforce specific institutional structures, which in turn
condition (but do not necessarily determine) firm strategies and behaviour.
Hall and Soskice (2001:21) are particularly careful to note that they were “not
arguing … that one is superior to the other” but instead that each specific
ideal-type institutional configuration creates complementarities that provide
firms with particular advantages for engaging in certain types of activities.
Moreover, they anticipate change in firm strategies in response to shifting
internal conditions and external shocks, but argue that any adjustments reflect
and accommodate pre-existing institutional advantages (i.e. there is an element
of path dependence).
Although the VoC approach was developed with the intention of analysing
patterns of modern capitalism in advanced industrial democracies, it provides
some useful insights and methodological tools for better understanding the
evolution of capitalism in developing economies. Schneider (2008 & 2009)
argues that the VoC approach is particularly attractive when studying Latin
American political economy. He argues that the VoC literature provides a fresh
view that adds value to analysing developments in the region (especially since
the 1990s), because it shifts attention away from the state to firms and issues
of corporate governance (this ‘firm’s eye view’ being particularly beneficial to
understanding the post-market reform economic context). He also notes the
growing interest in understanding micro-level issues related to capital-labour
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relations, the role of unions in collective bargaining, and the importance of
worker education and training (e.g. the neo-developmentalist approach sees
augmenting worker skills as a key area of public and private sector action,
given the onus is on firms to increase productivity and competitiveness in the
market sphere; moreover, investing in education is seen as crucial to raising
income/ reducing poverty in the longer run).
Although Schneider adopts the VoC approach, he disagrees with the
mainstream argument that there are only two basic types of capitalism. He
argues for the inclusion of a third type – the hierarchical market economy
(HME) – for analysing capitalism in Latin America. While I agree with the value
of applying a micro-level approach to complement more state-centred and macro-
level approaches of analysing capitalist development in the region, I am less
convinced of the value of adding a distinct third type to understanding
capitalism in Brazil (this point is discussed further in the conclusion).
Brazil and the two varieties of capitalism
Most analyses of key national features of capitalism and mechanisms for
dealing with internal coordination problems within Brazil made clear that the
Brazilian case diverged from both the ideal types (LMEs and CMEs), mainly
because the state continued to be central to developments in the production
regime.2 Legacies of state corporatism still coloured business and labour attitudes
and behaviour towards the state, and any analysis that sought to exclude or
side-line the state would simply miss the most crucial agent in Brazil’s march
towards development. Thus, in Brazil, it would not be an exaggeration to claim
that social agents’ strategies were developed around their relations to the state,
whereas in LMEs, markets were the dominating organising principle in society,
and in CMEs, collaboration and coordination among social actors (capital
and labour) were the dominant features of societal interaction. In Brazil, the
state coordinated both market and non-market relations (in contrast to the
business-led coordination seen in CMEs) and hierarchies, with the state at the
apex. The state often determined the resolution of particularly problematic
aspects of coordination, and there remained an emphatic and pervasive (albeit
reduced) state presence in the overall functioning of the production regime.
The details of this interventionism were best observed at the micro-level in the
various spheres of firms’ actions in the economy (discussed in the next section).
The state played a vital role in organising the production regime’s response
to external pressures, such as shifts in technological paradigms,
internationalisation and globalisation. For example, President Lula’s Política
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de Inovação Tecnologica e Comercio Exterior (PITCE) of 2003 explicitly addressed
the state’s contribution and support to industry in dealing with the above
challenges. The state’s relations with multinational corporations (MNCs) and
the export sector also shaped the business environment and the development
strategies of industry. From the early 1990s, Brazil underwent a marked shift
towards market liberalisation, especially with respect to freer trade and greater
capital mobility. This directly impacted the attitude and behaviour of firms
operating in Brazil not least because of the increased presence of foreign
investment (both direct and portfolio). There was some evidence that these
shifts led to an overall increased reliance on market/competition based relations
in certain industrial sectors, but there were few calls for deregulation or the
exit of the state. Instead evidence suggested a cautious attitude towards
deregulation and a continued appreciation for state coordination when
necessary to support industry against the vagaries of global markets (Doctor
& de Paula 2007). For example, the strength of the Brazilian domestic banking
sector, evident in its continued good performance in 2008-09 in the midst of
the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression, was readily
attributable to the resolute hand of state regulation and the strong presence
of state-owned banks.
To summarise, the general features of Brazilian capitalism, with respect to
its responses to internal and external pressures and shifting conditions, generally
leaned towards the CME variety, although with a much more prominent role
for the state than envisioned in the VoC ideal type. Typically, whereas the
CME tended to see business lead with state backing, the Brazilian profile was
one of state leadership and private sector followership. Thus, general trends
viewed at the aggregate or macro-level seemed to point Brazil in the direction
of a more coordinated variety of capitalism (albeit more state- than business-
led), a finding that was in line with much academic research on Brazil.
Firms’ spheres of action
The VoC approach takes a relational view of the firm (Hall & Soskice 2001)
and focuses on four key spheres of action, where firms concentrate their efforts
to resolve coordination problems related to their productive activities. The
first two areas relate to the firm’s actions with respect to its workers, while the
other two relate to the firm’s interaction with capital (its owners and other
firms). The following analysis is limited to the formal sector. However, it must
be emphasised that informal sector or non-registered firms (which form a
large proportion of firms and a key source of employment in Brazil) faced
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rather different circumstances. They often operated in arduous conditions
with only a grim chance of survival in what often was a fiercely hierarchical
and savagely market dominated pattern of interaction.
First, in the sphere of industrial relations, the Brazilian production regime
was traditionally characterised by hierarchical and conflictual capital-labour
relations that were subject to state intervention, regulation and control. The
precarious nature of employment contracts, the high levels of employee
turnover, the weak union presence in the firm, the minimal levels of collective
bargaining and atomised nature of labour’s situation (Schneider 2008; Delgado
2008) all pointed to features reminiscent of the conditions of semi- and low-
skilled workers in LMEs.
The condition of industrial relations in Brazil could hardly show a bigger
contrast when compared to CMEs. Yet, this need not necessarily be the case,
since the Brazilian political economy was very much shaped by corporatist
traditions in the urban industrial context that were very similar to the ones
prevalent in continental Europe. The evolution of Brazil’s previous rigidly
state corporatist institutions into more society-friendly forms of neo-corporatist
relations was not inconceivable. I have argued this position elsewhere (for
example, see Power & Doctor 2004; Doctor 2007; Doctor 2007a).
Second, the education and training system prevalent in Brazil again
resembled the LME in that workers were generally poorly trained, semi-skilled,
with little opportunity to develop firm specific skills. Firms and business
associations made little direct contribution to the overall education and
training system for workers with the exception of minimal levels of on-the-
job training necessary for completing the immediate task at hand. What
education and training was provided tended to be coordinated by the state
(where available) via the semi-public Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial
(SENAI), which was part of Brazil’s “Sistema S” - a remnant of the old state
corporatist development project. High employee turnover (on average every
three years) in many ways justified employers’ attitudes towards worker training,
skills and capacity building.
Again, this was an important sphere of firm activity which could easily be
upgraded to CME standards with the mutual cooperation of business
associations and the state. Institutions that could be given responsibility for
this type of coordination already were in place, for example, SENAI and the
Centros de Formação e Educação Tecnologica (CEFET). SENAI already operated the
largest vocational education complex in Latin America, registering about two
million individuals in over 2000 different types and levels of courses every
year. Thus, this organisation, formally attached to the state federations of
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industry and funded by the obligatory corporatist “imposto sindical” charged
to all firms, already played a crucial role in training workers in cooperation
with business federations in some 28 industrial sectors, where Brazil had
developed competencies and competitiveness (President Lula himself had
benefited from SENAI training offered to metallurgical workers in Sao Paulo).
The recent process of market reforms gave rise to criticisms from some sectors
of entrepreneurs, who argued that the market would deal better with worker
training and apprenticeship than public institutions. However, it was difficult
to agree with this particular aspect of the calls to dismantle the surviving
elements of the corporatist institutional structure, since it was not clear that it
would be feasible to create an independent vocational training and industrial
apprenticeship system that could efficiently replace SENAI.
Third, Brazilian firms’ interaction with the financial system and issues of
corporate governance were undergoing the fastest degree of change in a
LME direction. This was one area where Schneider’s HME variety had made
particularly apt points (relevant until recently). The Brazilian productive regime
was traditionally a universe populated with large family-owned diversified
business conglomerates operating side by side with MNCs. The former with
inter-locking horizontal and vertical relationships relied on hierarchy and
networks to determine investment strategy, while the latter as subsidiaries of
foreign-owned firms often also relied on hierarchy and non-market relations
with their parent company to determine their investment strategies. However,
there are many indications that the profile of Brazilian business was moving
away from the earlier family-run hierarchical structures (Diniz & Boschi 2003).
Most Brazilian businesses relied on internal resources and reinvested profits
rather than debt or equity to finance investments. Even small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs) typically saw little scope in financing investment via
credit or equity. In the case of large and long-term investment projects, the
state development bank, BNDES, extended financing to big firms, business
conglomerates and even MNCs, often at subsidised rates. Thus, in Brazil, the
main bank relationship central to financing investment projects in CMEs,
was replaced by a state-owned bank as chief source of finance for larger
investment projects. The state financing option was only recently extended
to include SMEs under specific conditions and for particular types of activities.
Thus, traditionally the Brazilian pattern of investment financing had mixed
elements, but leaned more to the CME variety with non-market factors often
marking investment financing decisions.
The economic liberalisation process and market-oriented reforms of the
1990s were clearly influencing the scope for firms to attract investment financing
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via the market. It must be emphasised that the availability of credit and capital
for investment (from both the public and private banking system) remained
extremely limited throughout this period, even after monetary stabilisation in
1994 (Barros de Castro, 2008), partly because the government’s debt financing
needs crowded out the private sector. However, the adjustment challenge facing
firms during the market reform process, mainly expressed in the need to restructure
and modernise business models, often required access to substantial financial
resources. As the demand for external market-based funding to finance much
needed industrial modernisation increased, so also grew the professionalisation
of management in family-owned firms with a concomitant diminution in
hierarchy and non-market forms of corporate governance.
In addition, the continuing expansion of the local stock market and other
emerging LME features of the finance system (including the listing of large
Brazilian firms in foreign stock exchanges such as New York) had a significant
impact on the mode of corporate governance. As a consequence of the growing
importance of market-based financing for funding investment in Brazil,
corporate governance distinctly shifted towards LME patterns which
emphasised shareholder value, short-term profit indicators, and so on. Thus,
the features prevalent in LME corporate governance patterns should be expected
to gain a higher profile in Brazil in the coming years. For example, Leopoldi
(2009 forthcoming) argues that changes in corporate governance were more
likely to have been induced by requirements of the CVM (Comissão de Valores
Imobiliarios/Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) than adopted due
to a shift to liberal values within firms.
Fourth, in the sphere of inter-firm relations, many Brazilian firms used to
operate in a hierarchical and non-market based environment. Hierarchy was
particularly evident in large firms’ relations with their suppliers and even their
clients. Informal relations were typical within the diversified group, while
market-based competitive relations were more likely with those outside the
group. Meanwhile, SMEs typically faced arms-length market-based relations
with the firms they interacted with – whether as clients or suppliers. Brazilian
business often expressed cautious attitudes towards coordination and
collaboration among firms that normally interacted on the basis of market
relations (competitors, suppliers or clients). Thus, this sphere of the firms’
activities was one of mixed features. For the vast majority of firms, LME style
patterns prevailed, although larger firms (domestic conglomerates or MNCs)
enjoyed some features of CME collaboration or even HME style dominance.
To summarise, the overall pattern of activity that shaped the firm’s
operational environment strongly resembled the features found in LMEs.
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Brazilian firms’ capacity to react flexibly to accommodate change included
the ability to adjust corporate governance in an LME direction when necessary.
Thus, for example, firms such as Metal Leve and Seguros Sul América (icons of
the ISI period as successful nationally-owned firm in the autoparts and
insurance sectors respectively) were quick to sell shares to foreign investors
when business strategy indicated the sense/value of doing so. Thus, looking
at Brazil from a bottom-up or micro-to-macro perspective provided a rather
unexpected picture of LME type capitalism, mainly as a pragmatic response to
the changing institutional and policy environment. Interestingly, the top
down approach of most earlier analyses of Brazilian development would have
suggested a CME or even HME variety, patterns that were in contrast to the
actual direction of current firm strategies and behaviour in the prevalent (and
shifting) institutional environment.
Economic and social impacts of the production regime
One of the principle points of focus of the VoC approach was to use a
micro-level analysis to provide a system-level analysis of capitalism in terms of
its socioeconomic and political impacts in two areas – the production regime
and the welfare state. The analysis of the production regime in Brazil cast
light on how the specific configuration of institutions shaped micro behaviour
(sometimes in unexpected ways). So, what were the consequences of the
behaviour and choices of social agents acting within the prevalent institutional
framework of the production regime? Here it made sense to briefly consider
three aspects: the science system, the nature of innovation and technological
development, and the results in terms of industrial specialisation.
A number of studies have demonstrated that Brazil had a rather weak
science system and links between firms and the scientific community were
unsubstantial (Dahlman & Frischtak 1993; De Negri, Salerno & Barros de Castro
2005; Katz 2006). Of course, there were exceptions, but these were few and far
between (e.g. Embraer, Itautec, Petrobras). A large proportion of pure science
as well as (more applied) innovation directed research for industry was
conducted under the aegis of state funding (the agriculture/agribusiness sector
was much more active in terms of private sector initiatives to fund R&D). In
2005, although the highest in Latin America, Brazil’s total expenditure on
research and development as a percentage of GDP was only 0.97% (compared
with China at 1.34%; South Korea at 2.99%; Chile at 0.68%). The share of
private sector R&D was only 0.51% of GDP, indicating a large percentage was
still funded by the public sector (MCT 2007). More encouragingly, the number
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of Brazilian academics publishing articles in international scientific journals
went up from only 0.44% of world share in 1981 to 1.92% in 2006 (MCT
2007). Other indicators of science output remain much lower than in other
regions (Alcorta & Peres 1998; Maloney & Perry 2005), although improving.
Even a cursory glance at the relations between Brazilian universities and
industry show the low levels of joint effort or cooperation (again there are
some notable exceptions such as the Coppe/UFRJ and Fiocruz in Rio, ITA in São
Jose dos Campos, and the Federal University of São Carlos in São Paulo). Expert
opinion as well as anecdotal evidence suggested that creating the elements of
pure LME style competition-driven research between universities, research
institutions and firm’s technological development centres simply would not be
a feasible means of developing the science system in the short to medium term
in Brazil. Thus, CME-style collaborative relations between firms and research
institutions, including public universities, were a more realistic path to enhancing
research capabilities in Brazil. The Ministry of Science and Technology’s Plan of
Action for 2007-2010, Ciencia, Tecnologia e Inovação para o Desenvolvimento Nacional,
was a step in this direction. Recent legislation, such as the Lei da Inovação and
Lei do Bem, also manifested the clear intention of the government to foster
these types of collaboration. Organisations such as FINEP and BNDES were
given extensive remits with respect to supporting and financing innovation.
Thus, the disarticulated relation between the science system and the productive
system hindered progress in creating an effective national system of innovation
capable of boosting technological development and industrial performance
(Dahlman & Frischtak 1993; Suzigan & Furtado 2006; Doctor 2009). In Brazil,
innovation was often devoted to improving managerial techniques and to
perfecting industrial processes often in the form of incremental learning-by-
doing. Weak protection of intellectual property and limited availability of
financing for product innovation as well as for development of cutting edge
technologies and innovative products resulted in an innovation profile that
was unlike that of typical LMEs. However, many of the features of the incipient
national system of innovation in Brazil resembled the CME innovation and
technological development profile, although at a much lower level of activity
and performance (incremental innovation, importance of tacit knowledge and
in-house innovation, state support for technological development activity, etc.).
However, these features are undergoing change as the government and business
associations prod firms into a more active pursuit of innovation (Salerno &
Kubota 2008; Arbix 2007).
Hence, given the above characteristics of firms and the technology system,
it was not surprising to note that Brazil’s industrial specialisation profile had
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an emphasis in technologically mature and resource-based sectors such as
automotive, metal-mechanical, machines and office equipment, food
processing, paper and cellulose, consumer durables, etc. Of course, there were
also some surprises such as the competitive success of Embraer (aeronautics),
flexfuel motors (biofuels/alternative energy), vaccines and treatments for
tropical diseases (pharmaceuticals), and various agriculture sector biotechnology
firms. Overall, the nature of Brazil’s industrial profile was much closer to that
found in the European CMEs than in the Anglo-Saxon LMEs.
If one considered outcomes of the VoC on the institutions of the welfare
state and areas of social policy as well as outcomes in terms of equality and
social justice, the picture created in the production regime is completely reversed.
In most social welfare areas, Brazil was much more like the LMEs in that there
was only a weak welfare system, the state provided very limited and selective
social protection (although there have been some changes under the current
government), and business tried to minimise its contributions to and support
for this policy area. Evidence suggested that capitalism as practised in Brazil
exacerbated income and social inequalities (Huber & Stephens 2009). Moreover,
it failed to create a strong sense of citizenship and social inclusion, features
that were not alien to the LME.
Conclusions and value of the VoC approach for Brazil
The article aimed to identify whether Brazil fit any of the VoC classifications.
It also examined whether Brazil’s production regime had settled on a hybrid
variety or whether it was still evolving towards an ideal type VoC. By picking
apart and unravelling the micro- from the macro-level, a complex and even
confusing picture emerged. On the one hand, at the micro-level (so favoured
by the VoC approach), firms clearly were engaged in an increasingly LME
pattern of relations. Even where elements of hierarchy or non-market based
collaboration persisted, these were muted and often overwhelmed by the
strongly market-biased considerations shaping firm production, investment
and survival strategies. This competitive battle for the survival of the fittest
was the sort of scenario very familiar to business studies and to market analysts
working on Brazil (but probably sat more uncomfortably with political
economists and political scientists).
On the other hand, at the macro- and meso-level, firms often were forced
to bow (individually and collectively) to the weight of the ever-present state.
Patterns of state intervention and coordination with capital and labour were
reminiscent of CMEs (especially the sector-based CMEs of central Europe with
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strong corporatist histories or neo-corporatist institutional structures and
French “dirigiste” characteristics). Much of the institutional framework and
behavioural patterns of social agents in Brazil bore the marks of their state
corporatist past, which favoured close interaction between state and private
sector with the former taking the lead in such relations. Thus, a macro view,
more familiar to analysts of Brazilian political economy, stressed the features
of the production regime that diverged from LMEs and the difficulty of any
evolution in that direction. From this point of view, the VoC approach might
highlight the individual plight of firms or collective challenges facing sectors,
but a micro-level view would not provide a true picture of the nature of
capitalism as practised (at the systemic level) in Brazil so long as its classification
criteria failed to give the state a central part in the evolution of capitalism.
Another point worth considering here is that while institutional structures
tend to be more fixed (at least in the short and medium term), firms and other
social actors can be more flexible in adapting their behaviour and responses to
changing conditions. In this context, Brazilian entrepreneurs and managers,
long accustomed to the need to react quickly to volatility in markets and policy
conditions, were particularly well-adapted to respond efficiently to new
circumstances. Thus, one could argue that the business culture was ahead of
the game in terms of showing an eagerness to demonstrate openness to new
management ideas and to adapt flexibly to liberal tenets in the market.3
Finally, to answer the questions set out at the start of the article, I concluded
that if one took a micro-level perspective that focused on the actions of firms
(individually and collectively), then one would be inclined to argue that Brazil
had not yet settled into a new equilibrium in the institutional framework of
its production regime. The exhaustion of the ISI model and the implementation
of market reforms in the past fifteen years were still working their way through
the system, and firms had not yet found an ideal pattern of action in the
various spheres of their activity. Thus, a VoC approach to answering the
question would come to the rather surprising and even controversial conclusion
that Brazil was not at an institutional equilibrium, but was still evolving
towards one of the varieties, with all micro-level signs pointing in a LME
direction. However, VoC analysis also suggested that the weight of path
dependency and past comparative institutional advantages might actually
hinder this process and favour another re-adjustment in firm behaviour (in
this case in a CME direction?). So, although the final outcome is unclear, the
VoC approach would argue that the tensions between the micro and macro
level – between firms and the state – would lead to further adaptation and
change in the production regime.
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If one took a macro-level or top-down view to answering these questions,
then one was more likely to conclude that Brazil was at a relative equilibrium
with respect to its production regime. Moreover, the continuing importance
of state coordination in the economy and the overall stability of the
institutional matrix in place over the past decades actually favoured the
strengthening of CME features. This picture of the Brazilian VoC was certainly
more in line with previous analysis and with the actions of President Lula’s
government, which gave a high rhetorical and policy profile to more
coordination amongst social actors and a greater presence of the state in the
economic and social sphere (Doctor 2007a). However, given the overall
institutional stability, and the presence of clearly LME type actions in firm
behaviour in the midst of otherwise prominently CME features, one could
categorize Brazil as just one more hybrid variety of capitalism. The question
from an industrial development point of view then becomes: does the specific
hybrid variety to be found in Brazil reinforce institutional complementarities
to enhance economic outcomes? The neo-developmentalist agenda, where
the focus is on active state intervention to correct market failures which inhibit
industrial development (Stiglitz 2005), could be delineated better using a VoC
lens. Policies could be tailored to accommodate the macro and microeconomic
trends as analysed in this article.
Either way, the analysis clearly indicates that in the case of Brazil adding
an additional variety – the HME – would not really contribute to the analysis
or ease the classification process. Some of the key features identified by
Schneider (2009) are of declining relevance to understanding the evolution of
the Brazilian political economy.
To conclude, my interest in these debates relates to the insights they might
provide in understanding the action necessary on the public policy front to
boost industrial development. The intention here was not to prescribe particular
state actions or firm strategies, but rather to analyse what would be necessary
to achieve the stated objectives of the key actors in the production regime and
to provoke discussion of Brazil’s development options. Finally, I hope the
firm’s eye view of the production regime, borrowed from the VoC approach,
provided food for thought in terms of whether Brazilian society was pulling
in a different direction than the state. And if it was doing so, what would the
longer term consequences of this be for Brazilian business?
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